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In its report Averting the Old Age Crisis, the World Bank (1994) 
argued that OECD and Eastern European economies and several Latin 
American economies faced imminent problems with their retirement 
income systems. It said that the public pillars of national social security 
pension systems should not be relied on to solve these problems, as 
high tax rates are required to fi nance them and they inhibit growth and 
reduce rates of return to workers. Believing that the social security pil-
lar of retirement income would become more costly in the future, the 
report recommended that these countries make the transition to a mul-
tipillar system, which would include a privately managed, mandatory 
personal retirement savings plan. 
In Ireland, the publication of the World Bank report coincided with 
a survey of occupational and personal pension coverage. The results of 
this survey were published in 1996 (Hughes and Whelan 1996). The 
report revealed that less than half of those in employment and less than 
one-tenth of those not economically active were covered by a pension 
plan. Following publication of the survey results, the Pensions Board 
and the Department of Social, Community and Family affairs jointly 
sponsored a National Pensions Policy Initiative. The purpose of this ini-
tiative was to facilitate a national debate on how to develop the national 
pension system. In its report Securing Retirement Income, the Pensions 
Board (1998) recommended that a legal framework be put in place that 
would encourage private sector fi nancial institutions to introduce on a 
voluntary basis a new type of pension product, the Personal Retirement 
Savings Account (PRSA). The retirement income system in Ireland 
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consists now of a mandatory social security program, a means-tested 
social assistance program, voluntary occupational pensions provided 
by employers, PRSAs provided by employers mandatorily but with vol-
untary participation by workers, and voluntary personal pensions.
OBJECTIVES SET FOR PRSAs
The primary objective set for the PRSA was to increase coverage 
of private pension plans for those aged 30 and over from 54 percent to 
70 percent within 10 years of their introduction. In terms of all those at 
work, this objective can be expressed as a requirement to increase the 
coverage rate from less than half to 60 percent in a 10-year period. 
A wide range of other objectives were set for PRSAs, but no sys-
tematic effort has been made to publish information that would facilitate 
evaluation of how successful they are in achieving these objectives. 
However, a number of key objectives of PRSAs for which enough in-
formation is published facilitate an evaluation of how well PRSAs have 
performed since their introduction. There are six key objectives set for 
the PRSA product:
1) It should be a lower-cost product than was available in the past.
2) In addition to traditional providers of pensions, the PRSA 
should be supplied by the post offi ce and other retail outlets, 
such as supermarkets.
3) It should have a fl exible retirement age. 
4) Owners of PRSAs should eventually buy an annuity for life.
5) It should be mandatory for all employers, except those with 
occupational plans for all employees, to provide access for all 
their employees to a PRSA provider. 
6) The primary market for the PRSA should be employees in 
nonpensionable employment, and individuals who change or 
lose their jobs should be able to continue contributing to their 
pensions.1 
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Some of the key objectives set for PRSAs can be evaluated on 
the basis of the terms and conditions on which the new pension sav-
ing product was introduced after negotiations between the government 
and pension providers, while others require data stretching back to 
September 2003 when the new product was introduced. We begin our 
evaluation by considering objectives 1–4 in the list above and then pro-
ceeding to consider objectives 5–6 together with the primary objective 
of increasing pension coverage from less than half to 60 percent within 
a 10-year period.
PRSA FEES AND PROVIDERS 
The terms and conditions on which PRSA products were issued 
by pension providers differed in important respects from those envis-
aged by the Pensions Board in its report Securing Retirement Income 
(1998). Instead of one PRSA product with government certifi cation 
to indicate that it met certain quality requirements, two products were 
introduced—the standard PRSA and the nonstandard PRSA. The differ-
ence between the two is that the fees for a standard PRSA are capped 
at 5 percent of PRSA contributions and 1 percent of PRSA assets, and 
it can invest only in unit funds, whereas a nonstandard PRSA has no 
cap on fees and it can invest in a wide choice of assets. Far from being 
a lower-cost product than personal pension products previously avail-
able, the standard PRSA turned out to have higher fees than was usual 
for existing personal pension products. 
Table 3.1 shows how fees for a standard PRSA compare with those 
for an Additional Voluntary Contribution (AVC) plan for teachers oper-
ated by Cornmarket Group Financial Services, an off-the-shelf personal 
pension marketed by one of the largest providers of pensions in Ireland, 
the Irish Life Assurance Company, and fees for existing personal pen-
sion products. For an Irish Life personal pension, a fl at rate fee of €3.81 
per contribution was charged, whereas 5 percent of each contribution 
was deducted for the standard PRSA, and the annual management fee 
for the Irish Life pension was 0.9 percent compared with 1 percent for 
the PRSA. The capped fee for a standard PRSA of 5 percent of each 
contribution is the same as the usual fee for a personal pension contract, 
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Charge for each 
contribution
5% €3.81 5% 5% 0 0.9% 3.5%
Annual management 
charge (%)
1 0.9 0.75 1.25 1 0.2 0.45a
Once off charge 0 0 0 €732 0 0
aAn increment of 0.05 percent can be added for the best performing funds.
SOURCE: Brady (2001a), Fultz (2012), and O’Quigley (2003).
Have PRSAs Achieved Their Objectives in Ireland?  43
but the annual 1 percent fee levied on the value of the fund is higher 
than the usual annual fee of 0.75 percent of the value of the fund for a 
personal pension contract. The note by O’Quigley (2003), which pro-
vides the information on the usual fees for personal pension contracts, 
points out that the fees for a standard PRSA are “not particularly low” 
and that fees per contribution for personal pensions are “frequently less” 
than 5 percent. Although the annual fee of 1.25 percent of the value of 
the fund by Cornmarket Group for an AVC for a teacher is higher than 
the annual fee for a standard PRSA, the source of the information for 
this group, Brady (2001a, p. 12), points out that they were charging “at 
the top end of what is normal practice in the pensions business.” Fees 
for a standard PRSA were also higher than fees for a Stakeholder Pen-
sion in the UK, which was introduced in 2001, two years earlier than 
the PRSA. The only fee for a Stakeholder Pension was the 1 percent 
annual management fee.2 PRSA fees are also higher than the revised 
maximum fees imposed in 2010 in Hungary on mandatory and volun-
tary private pension investment accounts and on mandatory accounts in 
Poland in 2012. The deductions from contributions in Ireland are nearly 
40 percent greater than in Poland while the annual management fees 
are two-thirds greater. Both sets of fees are fi ve times greater in Ireland 
than in Hungary. 
Why did the standard PRSA turn out to be a higher-cost product 
than envisaged by the Pensions Board? The main reason appears to be 
that the pension providers were not prepared to offer a PRSA at a much 
lower cost than they previously charged for a personal pension, and 
they were able to insist on this because the government was not willing 
to offer the PRSA product without their cooperation 
During the negotiations between pension providers and the govern-
ment on the terms and conditions that would be attached to the new 
PRSA product, fi nancial journalists discovered from their own sources 
that the providers were opposed to both a government certifi cation and 
any cap on their fees. For example, Kerby (2001, p. 52) reports in Busi-
ness and Finance magazine that “the pension companies lobbied hard 
against a kite-mark or a maximum charge (they certainly didn’t want 
anything like the total 1 percent limit imposed on Stakeholder, the UK 
version of the PRSA).” 
What emerged eventually from the negotiations was a compromise 
under which the providers would offer a standard PRSA, with fees gen-
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erally higher than usual for previous personal pension products, and 
they would offer a nonstandard PRSA, which allowed the providers to 
levy higher fees than previous personal pension products. In the same 
article, Kerby (2001, p. 52) points out that “the non-standard PRSA is 
certainly a compromise—a way for the pension companies (who have 
had this market to themselves up to now) to earn higher margins and to 
reward their commission-paid brokers.”
Subsequently, another journalist (Brady 2001b) investigating the 
negotiations between pension providers and the government, found a 
letter under the Freedom of Information Act from the Irish Insurance 
Federation that warned that “if the eventual regime does not give suf-
fi cient scope for profi tability” there is a danger that “only a limited 
number of providers [will] choose to enter the market.”
Very little additional information has emerged about the negotia-
tions between pension providers and the government, but it is likely that 
the traditional pension providers were also opposed to new providers 
entering the pensions market. Neither the post offi ce nor other retail 
outlets, such as national supermarket chain stores, entered the pensions 
market. The traditional providers may also have been opposed to a fl ex-
ible retirement age for the PRSA product, as when it was introduced it 
was stipulated that owners of PRSA products could not retire before 
age 60. The providers also appear to have been opposed to owners of 
PRSAs being obliged to take out an annuity. This was a requirement 
when the PRSA was introduced but the pensions industry frequently 
insisted that owners of PRSAs should be able to avail of the Approved 
Retirement Fund (ARF) and Approved Minimum Retirement Fund 
(AMRF) options in the same way as the self-employed. This objective 
was achieved in 2011 when the ARF and AMRF options were extended 
to owners of PRSAs.3
The hope, expressed by the Pensions Board and others, that pro-
moting the PRSA would help to simplify the pension system was not 
realized. Instead, it greatly increased the complexity of the choices that 
ordinary savers faced. One professional advisor, Gilhawley (2003), ar-
gued that what eventually emerged from the negotiations “isn’t a pretty 
sight” and that it “ensured that the PRSA market will be a jungle for the 
ordinary saver” (p. 7).
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PRSA ACCESS AND COVERAGE
Following agreement with pension providers on the terms and 
conditions on which a standard PRSA could be offered in the market, 
providers were accredited by the Pensions Board. Accredited providers 
started to advertise their PRSAs in April 2003 so that they would be 
ready to be nominated by employers as designated providers by Sep-
tember 2003. This was the date set by the Pensions Board by which the 
great majority of employers would be required by law to have nomi-
nated at least one provider to supply a PRSA to their employees. 
In June 2003, a few months before that date, the Irish Financial 
Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA), which was jointly responsible 
with the Pensions Board for regulating PRSAs, issued instructions to 
PRSA providers that suggested the regulators were concerned to avoid 
a repetition in Ireland of practices by personal pension providers, which 
led to the pensions misselling scandal in the UK in the 1990s (Ward 
2000). These instructions required providers at the point of sale to
• inform prospective clients about the difference between a stan-
dard and a nonstandard PRSA,
• have a statement signed by both parties that all risks have been 
pointed out and that all relevant information has been provided, 
and
• give clients the IFSRA consumer fact sheet about PRSAs to 
help them assess which type of PRSA would best suit their 
needs.
Kerby (2003) reports that the reason the IFSRA stipulated what in-
formation should be available to prospective purchasers of PRSAs was 
that the director of the consumer division of the IFSRA had said, “We 
do not want consumers encouraged to purchase a nonstandard PRSA 
when it is not required, simply to generate additional revenue for the 
fi nancial institutions.” 
The objective that all employers, except the 4 percent or so with oc-
cupational plans for all employees (Hughes and Whelan 1996), should 
designate a PRSA provider has fallen well short of target. Figures 3.1 
and 3.2 show, starting in September 2003, the cumulative number and 
percentage of employers who have designated a PRSA provider and 
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the cumulative number and percentage of fi rms in which employees 
have taken out PRSA contracts. It should be noted that we do not know 
how many employees continue to make PRSA contributions because 
the Pensions Board does not publish this information. Experience in 
the UK shows that about half of contributors to personal pensions have 
ceased to make contributions within four years of taking out a contract 
(Financial Services Authority 2006).
By the end of 2003, when all employers were legally obliged to 
designate a PRSA provider, only 58,770, or less than half of all the 
fi rms listed in the Companies Registration Offi ce, had nominated a pro-
vider. In those fi rms that had a designated provider, only 2,502, or less 
than 2 percent of all fi rms, had employees who had taken out a PRSA 
contract. This outcome of the long planning stage for the designation 
Figure 3.1  Number of Employers Designating a PRSA Provider and 
Number of Employer Designations Where Employees Have 












Employers designating a PRSA provider
Number of employer designations where contributions are being made
SOURCE: Pensions Board Web site: http://www.pensionsboard.ie/en/Regulation/
PRSAs (accessed November 14, 2013).
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of PRSA providers was so abysmal that in September 2004, a year after 
the launch, the Pensions Board contacted 64,000 fi rms to remind them 
of their legal obligation to designate a PRSA provider for their employ-
ees. In the period up to March 2012, about a decade after the launch of 
PRSAs, there has been an increase in the number of employers desig-
nating a provider and in the number of these fi rms in which employees 
have taken out a PRSA contract to 93,401 and 17,209, respectively. 
However, after an initial spurt in the number of employers designating a 
provider up to December 2005, the percentage of employers designating 
a provider has remained fairly stable at less than 50 percent, while the 
percentage of fi rms in which employees have taken out a PRSA contract 
has increased from less than 2 percent to around 10 percent. Looking 
at the fi gures in terms of employers who have designated a PRSA pro-
Figure 3.2  Percentage of Firms Designating a PRSA Provider and 









Mar 2004 Mar 2005 Mar 2006 Mar 2007 Mar 2008 Mar 2009 Mar 2010 Mar 2011
Percentage of firms designating a provider 
Percentage of firms with employee PRSA contracts
SOURCE: Pensions Board Web site: http://www.pensionsboard.ie/en/Regulation/
PRSAs (accessed November 14, 2013).
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vider, they show that 81 percent of employer-designated plans have no 
one contributing to them. Where employers do have employees who 
have taken out a PRSA contract, the average number of employees with 
contracts is about four. 
Figure 3.3 shows the cumulative number of standard, nonstandard, 
and total PRSAs sold. Sales were slow at fi rst but they increased rapidly 
so that by December 2012 over 200,000 PRSA contracts had been sold, 
of which over 150,000, or three-quarters, were standard, and almost 
50,000, or one-quarter, were nonstandard. On the face of it, this looks 
like a satisfactory outcome. That is what the Pensions Board implies in 
its quarterly press releases about the sales fi gures. However, the group 
for which PRSAs were originally intended are employees in nonpen-
sionable employment. But this is not the group to which most PRSAs 
have been sold. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the number of employees and 








Standard Nonstandard Total 
SOURCE: Pensions Board Web site: http://www.pensionsboard.ie/en/Regulation/
PRSAs (accessed November 14, 2013).
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self-employed and other individuals not in the labor force who have 
taken out PRSA contracts. 
In the fi rst year following their introduction, the number and per-
centage of employees and self-employed and those not in the labor 
force taking out a PRSA contract were about the same. After September 
2004, the number and percentage of self-employed and purchasers not 
in the labor force began to increase much more rapidly than employ-
ees. By March 2012, the cumulative number of purchasers of PRSA 
contracts who were self-employed or not in the labor force was double 
the number of employees who had taken out contracts—132,345 versus 
67,973—while the percentage of self-employed and purchasers not in 
the labor force relative to all those not in the labor force was three times 
greater, 9.4 percent versus 3.2 percent. 
Figure 3.4  Number of Employees and Self-Employed and Those Not 










Number of PRSA contracts under the designation
Self-employed and not in labor force having PRSA contracts
SOURCE: Pensions Board Web site: http://www.pensionsboard.ie/en/Regulation/
PRSAs (accessed November 14, 2013).
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Gilhawley (2007) has identifi ed four separate markets where PRSAs 
are being sold: 1) employees in nonpensionable employment—the tar-
get group for which PRSAs were originally intended; 2) self-employed 
individuals who can contribute to a Retirement Annuity Contract or a 
PRSA or both; 3) employees who are already in pensionable employ-
ment who have an AVC plan; and 4) employees and the self-employed 
who already have either an occupational pension or a Retirement An-
nuity Contract who can transfer their pension funds to a PRSA. The 
Pensions Board has not published suffi cient information to identify how 
many PRSA contracts have been taken out by each of these groups or 
by those not in the labor force who can also contribute to a PRSA. 
However, as employer-designated plans are obliged to offer at least one 
standard PRSA, it is reasonable to assume, as Gilhawley (2007) does, 
Figure 3.5  Percentage of Employees and Self-Employed and Those Not 













Percentage of employees having PRSA contracts
Percentage of self-employed and others not in labor force having PRSA contracts
SOURCE: Pensions Board Web site: http://www.pensionsboard.ie/en/Regulation/
PRSAs (accessed November 14, 2013).
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that all PRSAs purchased through an employer-designated plan are 
standard PRSAs. This assumption also enables us to identify how many 
standard and nonstandard PRSAs have been sold to the self-employed 
and other individuals not in the labor force.
Figure 3.6 shows that when the PRSA product was launched in Sep-
tember 2003, about one-third of all PRSA contracts were taken out by 
employees for whom they were intended, and about two-thirds were 
taken out by self-employed and others who were not in the labor force. 
In the fi rst two years of operation, there was a signifi cant increase in 
the percentage of all contracts bought by employees and a signifi cant 
decrease for the other group to almost 50 percent in each case. There-
after, the percentage of all PRSA contracts sold to employees gradually 
Figure 3.6  Standard PRSA Contracts Taken Out by Employees and  
PRSA Contracts Taken Out by Self-Employed and Those 










Employee contracts as % of all PRSA contracts 
Other contracts as % of all PRSA contracts
SOURCE: Pensions Board Web site: http://www.pensionsboard.ie/en/Regulation/
PRSAs (accessed November 14, 2013).
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decreased to around one-third, while the percentage sold to the self-
employed and others gradually increased to about two-thirds. In De-
cember 2011, the cumulative fi gures for PRSA contracts sold indicated 
that only one-third of the contracts have been sold into the target mar-
ket, while two-thirds have been bought by individuals for whom the 
PRSA product was not intended. 
Figure 3.7 shows the percentage of PRSA contracts purchased 
by the self-employed and individuals outside the labor force that are 
standard and nonstandard. In September 2003, when the PRSA was 
launched, about 54 percent of the contracts bought by people who were 
not working were standard PRSAs, while 46 percent were nonstandard. 
However, in the next quarter ending in December 2003, about two-
thirds of the PRSA products bought by the self-employed and others 
Figure 3.7  Percentage of PRSA Contracts Sold to Self-Employed 










% of PRSAs bought by self-employed and others which are standard
% of PRSAs bought by self-employed and others which are not standard
SOURCE: Pensions Board Web site: http://www.pensionsboard.ie/en/Regulation/
PRSAs (accessed November 14, 2013).
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not in the labor force were standard PRSAs while one-third were non-
standard. Subsequently, these proportions did not change much, so that 
by December 2011, about two-thirds of the PRSAs bought by the self-
employed and those not in the labor force were standard PRSAs, while 
one-third were nonstandard.
The infl uence of the self-employed on sales of PRSAs can be seen, 
as Gilhawley (2007) has noted, from the spikes in the quarterly fi gures 
for nonemployer designated sales, which occur in the last quarter of the 
year (Figure 3.8). These spikes are related to the October 31 tax dead-
line for backdating pension contributions by the self-employed to the 
previous tax year. 
Before the property bubble burst in Ireland in 2007, sales in the fi rst 
three quarters averaged around 3,000 per quarter, but this fi gure jumped 
to around 7,000 in the last quarter. After the property collapse, sales in 
Figure 3.8  Quarterly Sales of PRSA Contracts to Self-Employed and 












SOURCE: Pensions Board Web site: http://www.pensionsboard.ie/en/Regulation/
PRSAs (accessed November 14, 2013).
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the fi rst three quarters of the year fell back to around 2,000, while sales 
in the last quarter were about double this at around 4,000.
Almost 10 years after their introduction, sales of PRSAs to em-
ployees in nonpensionable employment, who are the target market, 
have been and continue to be low. On the other hand, sales to the self-
employed and others not in the labor force, for whom they were not 
intended, account for the signifi cant growth in sales of PRSAs.
EFFECT OF PRSAS ON PENSION COVERAGE
The primary objective that was set for PRSAs by the Pensions 
Board was that within 10 years of their introduction they would help 
to increase the coverage rate of private pension plans to 60 percent of 
those in employment. Special surveys of pension coverage in 2002, 
2005, and 2009 have been undertaken by the Central Statistics Of-
fi ce (2004, 2006, 2011). These surveys enable us to evaluate whether 
PRSAs have helped to increase the coverage rate of private pension 
plans in a way that will lead to the achievement of the 60 percent target 
by the end of 2013. Table 3.2 shows that, contrary to expectations, there 
was no increase in the coverage rate of personal pension plans between 
2002 and 2005, whereas there was an increase in the coverage rate of 
occupational plans. 
We know from the quarterly PRSA sales fi gures that 1.3 percent of 
employees had taken out a PRSA contract by the end of 2005, which 
Table 3.2  Coverage of Occupational and Personal Pension Plans as a 












Occupational pension only 35.4 40.1 38.9
Personal pension only 12.9 12.1 9.6
Both 2.9 2.8 2.5
Total pension coverage 51.2 55.0 51.0
SOURCE: Central Statistics Offi ce (2004, 2011) and author’s calculations.
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should have resulted in an increase in the personal pension coverage 
rate. The fact that the Central Statistics Offi ce survey did not pick up 
such an increase but instead recorded a much bigger increase in the 
occupational pension coverage rate suggests that the coverage of oc-
cupational pensions increased independently of the introduction of 
PRSAs. It may also indicate that many respondents to the survey who 
purchase a personal pension through an employer-designated plan may 
identify it as an occupational rather than a personal pension. 
In 2007, the Irish property market collapsed, and a year later the 
global fi nancial crisis began. Both of these events resulted in massive 
fi nancial and job losses across the Irish economy. For example, total 
employment fell by over 300,000, or by 15 percent, between the begin-
ning of 2008 and the end of 2010, and the real value of pension fund 
assets fell by 37.5 percent in 2008 compared with 22.3 percent in Hun-
gary, 17.7 percent in Poland, and a weighted average of 23.7 percent 
in the OECD as a whole (OECD 2011). The effect of these losses was 
that the gains made in private pension coverage between 2002 and 2005 
were lost so that the coverage of occupational and personal pension 
plans fell from 40 percent to 39 percent and from 12 percent to 10 per-
cent, respectively. Overall the private pension coverage rate fell from 
55 percent in 2005 to 51 percent in 2009. This brought the coverage rate 
in 2009 back to its level in 2002 before PRSAs were introduced. 
PRSAs HAVE REINFORCED EXISTING INEQUITIES
In order to promote PRSAs, the government gave them entitlements 
similar to other pension plans to tax reliefs (preferential tax treatment) 
on employer and employee contributions and investment income and 
capital gains, and made the PRSA pension taxable on payment. Table 
3.3 shows estimates of the cost of tax relief on PRSA contributions 
since 2004 together with the number of contributors who claimed tax 
relief. These fi gures do not include contributions made by employers 
or by employees through their employer-designated PRSA for rea-
sons explained in the note to Table 3.3. As employees contributing to 
a PRSA through an employer-designated plan are excluded from these 
fi gures, they refer to the cost of tax reliefs for contributors who are self-
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employed or not in the labor force. An estimate of the extent to which 
the fi gures in Table 3.3 are underestimated can be derived from ad-
ditional information that the Revenue Commissioners sought in 2006 
from employers about employer and employee contributions to PRSA 
and other pension plans. The improved data for 2006 show that the 
cost of tax reliefs for PRSA contributions amounted to €120 million 
and that there were 71,500 benefi ciaries (Government of Ireland 2007, 
Table 7.2). In 2006, therefore, the cost of tax reliefs for PRSAs ap-
pears to have been twice as great as the fi gure published in the Revenue 
Commissioners’ report, and the number of benefi ciaries appears to have 
been nearly 60 percent greater.
Table 3.3 shows that between 2004 and 2009, the Exchequer (the 
government treasury) has subsidized PRSAs by at least €320 million 
in the form of foregone tax. PRSA employer and employee contribu-
tions in 2006 amounted to €330 million, so in that year the Exchequer 
subsidy for PRSAs of €120 million amounted to 36 percent of total 
contributions.
In Ireland, government subsidies (through tax preferences) for 
private pensions overwhelmingly accrue to taxpayers with the largest 
incomes (Callan, Keane, and Walsh 2009; Hughes 2000; Hughes and 
Sinfi eld 2004), and some commentators (Hughes and Sinfi eld 2004) 
warned that the introduction of personal pension accounts would re-
inforce the existing inequalities. This warning has proved to be well 
founded. 
Table 3.3  Cost of Tax Relief on PRSA Contributions and Number of 
Benefi ciaries, 2006







NOTE: The fi gures do not include contributions made by employees through employ-
ers’ payroll systems and in respect of which tax relief is provided on the net pay basis. 
Information on such contributions is not captured in such a way as to make it possible 
to provide disaggregated fi gures. 
SOURCE: Revenue Commissioners Statistical Reports 2007–2010.
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Using data from the Revenue Commissioners, Figure 3.9 shows 
the distribution of the cost of tax reliefs by income decile for the self-
employed and others not in the labor force in 2006. Nearly 36 percent 
of the tax reliefs were captured by the top income decile, and over half 
of them accrued to the top income quintile. In sharp contrast, the bottom 
income decile received about 1.5 percent of the tax reliefs, and the bot-
tom income quintile received less than 3 percent of them.
CONCLUSION
The great hopes that advocates of private personal pensions in Ire-
land had for a new voluntary pension product, the Personal Retirement 
Figure 3.9  Percentage of Tax Relief on PRSA Contributions by Self-
Employed and Others Not in Labor Force Accruing to Each 










– – – – – – – –
SOURCE: Houses of the Oireachtas Web site: http://www.debates.oireachtas.ie/
dail/2009/06/30/00120.asp (accessed November 14, 2013).
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Savings Account, have not been realized. Few of the key objectives 
set by the government regulator of private pension plans have been at-
tained. The fees for a standard PRSA have generally been higher than 
the usual fees for personal pension products available before PRSAs 
were introduced. Neither the post offi ce nor other retail outlets, such 
as supermarket chain stores, entered the new market for personal pen-
sions. Standard PRSAs do not have a fl exible retirement age, as owners 
cannot receive their benefi ts until they are age 60. Owners of PRSAs 
are not obliged to buy an annuity if they can satisfy the conditions for 
transferring their PRSA pension fund into an ARF or an AMRF pension 
fund. While it was made mandatory that all employers who did not pro-
vide an occupational pension for all their employees should designate 
a personal pension provider for their employees, less than half of the 
fi rms registered with the Companies Offi ce have actually designated 
a PRSA provider. Employees in nonpensionable employment have 
shown limited interest in the PRSA product, as no one is contributing to 
a PRSA in four-fi fths of the fi rms that have designated a PRSA provider.
Up to the beginning of 2012, the take-up of PRSAs by employees 
has been very poor, with only 3 percent of employees deciding to buy a 
PRSA. The take-up has been much greater by a group for whom PRSAs 
were not intended—the self-employed and those not in the labor force. 
Approximately 9 percent of these have taken out PRSA contracts, and 
this group is now the largest market for personal pension products in 
Ireland. Up to the end of 2009, the introduction of PRSAs had failed to 
make any progress toward their primary objective of increasing pension 
coverage of the employed population to 60 percent—indeed, the cover-
age rate was slightly lower in 2009 than it was in 2002. Given the lack 
of trust in the private pension system’s ability to deliver on its promises, 
it is most unlikely that the coverage rate will reach anywhere near the 
60 percent fi gure by the end of 2013. 
In addition to failing to meet the objectives set by the government 
and the Pensions Board, PRSAs have reinforced inequities in the pri-
vate pension system that existed before PRSAs were introduced. As 
with previous private pension products, PRSAs have predominantly 
been bought by taxpayers in the top half of the income distribution. The 
benefi ts of government subsidies for PRSAs have been captured mainly 
by high-income earners, with over half of the tax reliefs for PRSAs 
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accruing to the top 20 percent of those who have claimed tax relief on 
their PRSA contributions.
Ireland has spent the last 15 years trying to shift the public/private 
balance of pension provision toward private pensions on a voluntary 
basis. This policy has failed; the pension coverage rate now is no greater 
than it was before the new personal pensions were introduced in 2003. 
Some advocates of private pensions argue that coverage should be 
made mandatory, as it is in some other countries like Poland, Hungary, 
and Australia. Consideration was given to mandatory approaches in the 
Pensions Board’s (2005) National Pensions Review in 2005 and in a 
report by Fitzpatrick Associates (2006) commissioned by the Pensions 
Board in 2006. The Fitzpatrick report considered a number of different 
mandatory models and concluded that “ . . . in general it would seem 
that the implementation of a mandatory scheme would generate simi-
lar effects to those of any new national tax. The extent of the negative 
impact on growth rates will be determined by . . . design and delivery 
issues . . .” (p. 23).
In addition to this negative assessment of mandatory plans, the ex-
perience of countries with mandatory private pensions suggests that 
this approach suffers from the same problems of high costs, lost tax 
revenue, and uncertain benefi ts as the voluntary approach (Fultz 2012). 
These problems could be avoided if Ireland were to adopt another ap-
proach that members of the Pension Policy Research Group at Trinity 
College Dublin have advocated for many years (Hughes and Stewart 
2007; Stewart 2005). 
They argue that it would be more equitable if tax relief for private 
pension saving was given only at the standard rate of tax and that the ad-
ditional tax revenue that this would generate should be used to increase 
the basic state pension to above the poverty level. As the great majority 
of employees in nonpensionable employment will be dependent in their 
retirement on the state pension, this solution has a number of merits. 
It would give them an assurance that they could look forward to a 
modest defi ned benefi t pension related to the average industrial wage 
rather than having to bear all the risks of a voluntary, soft mandatory, or 
mandatory PRSA defi ned contribution plan.  If the state pension were 
increased to around 40 percent of the average industrial wage it could 
signifi cantly reduce pensioner poverty. New Zealand has a fl at-rate pen-
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sion benefi t similar to Ireland’s, but at a higher level relative to the 
average wage, and it has one of the lowest rates of pensioner poverty in 
the OECD. It would reduce the cost of tax reliefs on private pensions 
in Ireland, which comparative research suggests are among the highest 
in the OECD (Yoo and de Serres 2004). It would provide the revenue 
needed to maintain the state pension at a time of economic crisis when 
there are calls to reduce it. Finally, it would introduce a greater measure 
of fairness into Ireland’s pension system by redistributing resources 
from the top 20 percent of households which receive nearly 80 percent 
of the pension tax reliefs to the 80 percent of households whose main 
source of retirement income is the state pension. 
Notes
I am grateful to Jim Stewart of Trinity College Dublin and Elaine Fultz of JMF Research 
Associates, Philadelphia, for comments on an earlier draft.
1. Previously, individuals who changed or lost their jobs had to cease contributing to 
their pension arrangement.
2. In 2005, the annual management fee for a Stakeholder Pension was increased to 
1.5 percent for the fi rst 10 years, after which it falls back to 1 percent.
3. An Approved Retirement Fund (ARF) option is an alternative to an annuity 
purchase. On retirement, the self-employed owner of a Retirement Annuity 
Contract or an owner of a PRSA can decide to invest the pension fund into a 
fund administered by a qualifying fund manager and take one-fourth of the value 
of the fund as a tax free lump sum. Income and gains from an ARF are tax free 
within the fund whereas drawdowns from the fund are subject to income tax. If 
the individual has a guaranteed retirement income less than 1.5 times the state Old 
Age Contributory Pension, the pension fund has to be invested in an Approved 
Minimum Retirement Fund (AMRF) until the person reaches age 75 when the 
AMRF can be transferred into an ARF. 
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